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1. Introduction 
Given the increasing amount of financial resources devoted to regional policies 
supporting private enterprises since the mid-1970s in Europe and abroad, a large and 
growing body of literature has investigated the policy contribution to growth and 
competitiveness of subsidized firms. However, the empirical evidence has provided mixed, 
if not contradictory, results. A recent review promoted by the European Commission to 
inform preparation of the 2014-20 programs (Mouqué, 2012) notes that while financial 
support to SMEs in lagging regions has been effective in increasing investment and creating 
jobs of good quality and longevity, productivity in subsidized firms has basically stayed the 
same. Ultimately, the main effect of the grant schemes examined is to make subsidized 
enterprises larger rather than more efficient.   
The result is not unexpected. In fact, policy makers use the financial incentive to 
change firm preferences and to push the firm to invest in projects that, without incentive, 
would normally be abandoned. The reason is that the social cost of the investment (and of 
the new employment) is lower than the cost for the firm because there are positive 
externalities in the less developed areas (Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011). The results might be 
different if the incentives were to overcome failure in the credit market. In this case, 
incentives could support projects with high productivity. This point is crucial for a regional 
policy: efficiency and competitiveness are the main factors for endogenous growth and 
long-term catch up by lagging regions. The risk is the policy of the lame duck that subsidizes 
firms that are unable to stay in the market (Mouqué, 2012).1 
                                                            
1 Indeed, capital subsidies may impede the Schumpeterian process of “creative destruction” that creates 
growth in the economy by shifting resources from low- to high-productivity plants (Moffat, 2014). 
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From an empirical point of view, the relationship between public subsidies and 
efficiency and productivity of subsidized firms is complex and not unique. However, only 
a few studies address the effect of capital subsidies on total factor productivity (TFP) (see 
Bergstrom, 2000; Harris and Trainor, 2005; Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011; Moffat, 2014; 
Criscuolo et al., 2016). Growth of TFP is a productivity measure that reflects the increase in 
total output that is not explained by the increase in capital and labor. Indeed, while labor 
productivity (output per worker) may grow simply because of the capital deepening 
induced by the subsidies, the efficiency with which all inputs are used (measured by TFP) 
may not increase at all. Then, TFP can be considered the most relevant productivity measure 
for analyzing the efficiency of a subsidized firm. However, one major drawback of this 
literature is that it does not provide results about the determinants of the changes in TFP 
caused by the subsidies. The analysis of the variation in the technical or allocative efficiency 
or in the dynamics of technological change among subsidized firms can explain the sources 
of the impact on TFP and sheds light on the mechanism that links subsidies to efficiency and 
competitiveness. For instance, we expect that public incentives increase the propensity to 
invest in new and more up-to-date capital, augmenting the rate of technological progress of 
the firm. On the other hand, firms can choose not to pursue the allocative efficiency if the 
increase in the use of one factor (for instance, labor) augments the probability of obtaining 
the subsidy. The overall effect of both behaviors on TFP is ambiguous and can be 
determined only by empirical analysis. 
The main contribution of this paper is to show that a suitable decomposition of TFP 
can be applied to a large sample of subsidized firms for a relevant period of time, allowing 
an evaluation of the impact of subsidies on either the roles of technological progress and 
technical efficiency change or scale and allocative efficiency change as determinants of 
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granted firms’ long-term growth. We measure and decompose TFP using a Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA). Besides SFA, which is a parametric method, two other non-
parametric methods are widely used in estimating TFP, Growth Accounting and Data 
Envelopment Analysis. The advantage of SFA is that it allows for the presence of 
idiosyncratic shocks, which are widely expected in our framework and can be used to 
investigate the determinants of technical inefficiency and thus those of TFP. SFA also has 
the great advantage of decomposing productivity change into parts that have a 
straightforward economic interpretation. Differently from Bernini and Pellegrini (2011), 
who used a simplified production function, the stochastic frontier model used in this study 
assumes that technical inefficiency evolves over time, which enables productivity changes 
to be decomposed into the change in technical efficiency (i.e., measuring the movement of 
an economy toward or away from the production frontier) and technological progress (i.e., 
measuring shifts in the frontier over time). Moreover, because a flexible technology is used, 
the SFA makes it possible to evaluate the presence of scale efficiency, as well as measure 
changes in allocative efficiency (i.e., the Bauer-Kumbhakar decomposition; see Kumbhakar, 
2000; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Brümmer et al., 2002).  
Note that, unlike Obeng and Sakano (2000) and Skuras et al. (2006), we are able to 
capture the impact of capital subsidies on the different components of TFP by a quasi-
experimental method. In fact, another important novelty of the paper is that we analyze the 
causal effect of capital subsidies on firm productivity by exploiting the conditions for a local 
random experiment created by Law 488/92 (L488), which has been an important policy 
instrument for reducing territorial disparities in Italy. In particular, L488 aims at boosting 
private investment in industrial structure development and job creation in the less-
developed areas of Italy, i.e. in the southern regions. Then, the analysis of the effects of 
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technological innovation and efficiency in these regions has a relevant importance for the 
local governance. As for the L488 mechanism, this policy has been characterized by a 
rigorous and transparent selection procedure. Each year, subsidies are allocated to a broad 
range of investment projects through regional “calls for tenders”, which mimic an auction 
mechanism. In each regional “call for tender”, the investment projects are ranked on the 
basis of a score that depends on a number of (known) characteristics of both the project and 
the firm. Projects receive subsidies according to their position in the ranking system until 
the financial resources granted to each region are exhausted. The presence of sharp 
discontinuities in the L488 rankings makes it possible to use a quasi-experimental method 
deriving from a regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach, enabling us to identify the 
causal effect of subsidies on components of firms’ TFP. 
Finally, a further novelty of the work is the timing used for the evaluation. We 
scrutinize the impact of the subsidy for each year, from the first to the fifth year, starting 
from the beginning of the investment. This way, we can capture effects that appear later, 
after the adjustment period of the subsidized firm, which could have a different sign from 
the first ones. Even this approach is quite unusual in the literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section summarizes the 
literature, while Section 3 describes the TFP decomposition and presents the evaluation 
method. In Section 4, we describe the policy and the data in more detail. The results are 
discussed in Section 5, while Section 6 assesses their robustness. Section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
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2. Literature review 
In the literature, there is considerable variation in the estimated impact of investment 
subsidies, which, among others, reflects differences in circumstances between countries, 
regions, sectors and firms, differences in the design of policy and delivery (policy 
implementation details) and differences in the quality of the data and the analytical methods 
used in the empirical studies (Brandsma et al., 2013). 
A large part of this literature has focused on the incentives to R&D (see Bronzini and 
Piselli, 2016; Dimos and Pugh, 2016), the Enterprise Zones (EZs) program (see Neumark and 
Kolko, 2010; Reynolds and Rohlin, 2015), and the effectiveness of investment incentives for 
firms located in lagging areas. Among the latter studies, the empirical evidence, although 
sketchy, suggests a positive impact of capital subsidies on financed firms’ employment, 
investment and plant survival prospects but a negligible or negative effect on productivity 
(see, among others, Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011; Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2014; Cerqua 
and Pellegrini, 2014; Criscuolo et al., 2016). 
Among this stream of research, a few papers have considered the impact of capital 
subsidies on TFP. Having estimated a production function, Bergstrom (2000) investigates 
the role of subsidies as a determinant of TFP growth. The author finds that after the first 
year, the more money a firm has been granted, the worse TFP growth develops. The results 
suggest that subsidization can influence growth, but there seems to be little evidence that 
the subsidies have affected productivity and hence competitiveness (i.e., growth is achieved 
simply by using more inputs but not by improving their usage). Harris and Robinson (2004) 
find opposite results by using a policy off/policy on model in which capital grants are 
treated as an input of the production function (i.e., TFP is defined as any change in output 
not due to changes in factor inputs). The analysis shows that assistance does improve 
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productivity compared with average levels; however, when the comparison group is 
defined more restrictively to only include other plants within Assisted Areas, assistance 
does not appear to significantly improve plant productivity. The analysis also indicates that 
this is not a uniform finding across all regions and that for plants located in Scotland as well 
as those in a small number of industries, the assistance does improve TFP. 
In a subsequent paper, Harris and Robinson (2005) break down TFP into different 
components (entry, exit, within plant, between plant, and cross-plant effects), applying a 
decomposition approach. The analysis is carried out by comparing non-assisted firms with 
firms assisted by different types of grants. They find that financed plants experienced 
negative TFP growth, mostly due to plants with low TFP that increase their market share 
during the period, suggesting that capital is being substituted for labor.  
A different decomposition procedure is used in Skuras et al. (2006). After having 
estimated a production frontier in which the subsidy is treated as a new input, the authors 
decompose the TFP into three components, which are technological change, technical 
efficiency change, and scale efficiency change. They find that capital subsidies to the food 
manufacturing sector are not fully additional and affect TFP growth mostly through 
technological change. Combining the above decomposition with a cost function approach, 
Obeng and Sakano (2000) find negative contributions of subsidies to TFP growth through 
subsidy-induced factor augmentation. 
Only a few papers have investigated the role of subsidies in TFP in a policy 
evaluation framework. Bernini and Pellegrini (2011), by means of a matching diff-in-diffs 
approach, show that growth in output, employment and fixed assets is higher in the 
subsidized firms. Conversely, TFP of subsidized firms shows a smaller increase than that in 
non-subsidized firms. The positive temporary effects of regional policy contrast with the 
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expected negative impact on long-term productivity and growth. However, in this paper 
the TFP is identified by the use of a simplified production function, and therefore cannot 
explain if changes in TFP can derive from adjustments in the use of factors or technology 
embodied in the subsided capital. Criscuolo et al. (2016) investigate the effects of the 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) by using a combination of IV and plant- or firm-level 
fixed effects. They find a positive program treatment effect on employment, investment and 
net entry but not on TFP. The treatment effect is confined to smaller firms with no effect for 
larger firms; moreover, the policy raises area-level manufacturing employment mainly 
through significantly reducing unemployment. Moffat (2014) examines whether receipt of 
a RSA grant has a causal impact on plant TFP. To tackle the problem of self-selection into 
the treatment group, propensity score matching is employed. Similar to Criscuolo et al. 
(2016), for high-tech and medium high-tech manufacturing, the effect is not statistically 
significant. However, for medium low-tech and low-tech manufacturing, receiving an RSA 
reduces TFP. Results suggest that RSA grants lead plants in low-tech manufacturing, the 
sector that received the highest number of grants, to employ an inefficiently high level of 
inputs. Without such grants to compensate them for employing a sub-optimally high level 
of inputs, they would employ fewer inputs but have higher levels of TFP. 
In sum, several studies have focused on the role of subsidies on firms’ TFP, mainly 
considering grants as an additional input in the production process or a determinant of TFP. 
Conversely, there are a few attempts to estimate the causal impact of capital subsidies on 
both TFP growth and their components by means of accurate counterfactual analysis. To 
our knowledge, no studies have yet investigated the role of capital subsidies on productivity 
and efficiency by means of a causal model. 
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3. Method 
3.1 SFA and TFP decomposition 
In the literature, studies on productivity growth have measured productivity as a 
residual after controlling for input growth, interpreting the improvements in productivity 
as determined by technological progress. This interpretation is correct only if firms are 
technically efficient (i.e., firms are operating on their production frontiers and realizing the 
full potential of the technology). Because firms do not usually operate on their frontiers, TFP 
measured in this way can reflect both technological innovation and changes in efficiency. 
Therefore, technological progress may not be the only source of total productivity growth, 
and it will be possible to increase factor productivity by improving technical efficiency (Jin 
et al., 2010). 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is a widely used approach to study production 
efficiency. SFA makes it possible to estimate technical efficiency in addition to technological 
change, which is captured by a time trend and interactions of the inputs with time (Aigner 
et al., 1977; Meeusen and van Den Broeck, 1977; Battese and Coelli, 1992). 
The general stochastic production frontier model is described as 
)();,,( itit uvititit eKLtfy
                                                                                        (1) 
where ity  is the output of the ith firm (i: 1,...,N) in period t (t:1,...,T), ( )f   is the production 
technology, itL  and itK are the inputs (i.e., labor and capital, respectively), t is the time trend 
variable, and   is the vector for the parameters defining the production technology. The 
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variables itv  refer to the random part of the error, while itu  are downward deviations from 
the production frontier. Thus, ( )( , , ; ) itvit itf t L K e  represents the stochastic frontier of 
production, and itv  capture the random effects of measuring errors and exogenous shocks 
that cause the position of the deterministic nucleus of the frontier, ( , , ; )it itf t L K  , to vary 
from firm to firm. The level of technical efficiency (TEit), that is, the ratio of observed output 
to potential output (given by the frontier), is captured by the component ( )itue   and, 
therefore, 0 ≤ TEit ≤ 1. 
Following Bauer (1990), Brümmer et al. (2002), Kumbhakar (2000), and Kumbhakar 
and Lovell (2000), after a production frontier function has been estimated, it is possible to 
compose the rate of TFP change from the results. In particular, the authors suggested a 
productivity decomposition that goes beyond the division of productivity changes to a 
catch-up effect and a technical innovation effect, also accounting for scale effects and 
efficient allocation of productive factors. 
The components of productivity change can be derived from the deterministic part 
of the production frontier depicted in (1) combined with the usual expression for the 
productivity change Divisia index2:  
TFP K Lg y s K s L                                                                                                     (2) 
where dots over variables indicate the rate of change for those variables, TFPg  denotes the 
rate of TFP growth, Ks  and Ls  are the shares of capital and labor in aggregate income, 
                                                            
2 Subscripts i and t are omitted to avoid notational clutter. 
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K
K
K L
p Ks
p K p L
    and  
L
L
K L
p Ls
p K p L
  , where Lp  and Kp  denote the price of labor 
and capital, respectively. 
Totally differentiating the logarithm of y  in (1) with respect to time, we have  
ln ) ( )K L
f(t,L,K; β uy K L
t t
               (3) 
where K  and L  are the output elasticities with respect to the factors of production. The 
overall productivity change (equation 3) is affected by either technological progress and 
changes in input use or change in technical efficiency. 
By substituting equation (3) into equation (2), we have 
ln ) 1 [ ] [ ]TFP K L K K L L
f(t,L,K; β ug (RTS ) λ K λ L (λ s )K (λ s )L
t t
          
      (4) 
where RTS denotes returns to scale with K LRTS    , and Kλ  and Lλ  are defined as 
normalized shares of capital and labor in income, i.e. /K Kλ RTS  and /L Lλ RTS .  
Then, equation (4) decomposes the growth in TFP into four additive components: 
trends in productivity change, change in the degree of the input-specific return to scale, 
change in cost and technical efficiencies. The decomposition suggests the intuitive result 
that advances in both technological progress and technical efficiency increases TFP growth; 
while the scale component measures TFP changes due to variation in scale of operations. 
The K K L L(λ s )K (λ s )L     component in equation (4) accounts for inefficiency in resource 
allocation resulting from deviation of input prices from the value of their marginal product. 
In details, these four components are defined as: 
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(i) technological change (TC), measured by ln ) /f(t,L,K; β t  ; 
(ii) change in technical efficiency (TE), denoted by / tu  ; 
(iii) change in the scale of production (SC), given by  ( 1)[ ]K LRTS K L    ; 
(iv) change in allocative efficiency (AE), measured by [( ) ( ) ]K K L Ls K s L     . 
Technological change (TC) is the increase in the maximum output that can be 
produced from a given level of inputs, thus capturing the upward shift in the production 
function. Technical efficiency (TE) change is the change in a firm’s ability to achieve 
maximum output given its set of inputs; then, it measures the changes in TFP because of a 
movement toward the production function. The scale component (SC) accounts for TFP 
changes due to variations in the scale of operations, its contribution depending both on 
technology and factor accumulation. The presence of constant returns to scale (RTS=1) 
cancels out the SC. In the case of increasing returns to scale (RTS > 1) and an increase in the 
amount of productive factors, the firm shows a higher rate of productivity growth. If the 
amounts of production factors diminish, the firm would have a reduction in the rate of 
productivity change. An inverse analogous reasoning can be made for decreasing returns 
and a reduction (increase) in the amount of productive factors. Allocative efficiency (AE) 
change is the change in a firm’s ability to select a level of inputs to ensure that the input 
price ratios equal the ratios of the corresponding marginal products. Because 1K L   , the 
distances ( )K Ks   and ( )L Ls   are symmetric and have opposite signs. Therefore, a factor 
reallocation that, say, increases the intensity of labor and reduces that of capital will 
necessarily bring a change in allocative efficiency.  
The three components SC, TC and TE are called the connected to technology part of the 
TFP change, which can be calculated using the estimated production technology (i.e., the 
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parameters in the output distance function and the technical efficiency estimates of equation 
1). The allocative component AE is caused by the violations of the first-order conditions for 
profit maximization. These violations might occur if market imperfections exist (i.e., 
transaction costs, risk, quantitative restrictions, incomplete information, or mark-ups) or if 
the implied assumption of profit maximization behavior is not adequate. Because these 
effects are caused by market or behavioral conditions (i.e., they represent the part of the TFP 
change that is not determined technologically), the allocative component AE is referred to 
as the connected to market part of the TFP change. Obviously, it accounts for the differences 
between the Divisia index and the three technology-connected components, i.e., 
)( TETCSCgAE TFP   (Brümmer et al., 2002; Zhu et al., 2006). 
 
3.2 The multiple RDD 
Support programs usually select firms in a non-random manner, and L488 is no 
exception. However, we can build a reliable counterfactual using data for the firms that 
applied for the incentives but were not financed because they scored too low in the L488 
ranking.3 Unlike in randomized experiments, this control group is not random, but we can 
use a “sharp” RDD approach to address selection bias issues. We have a “sharp” RDD since 
the treatment variable is a deterministic function of the forcing variable as it solely depends 
on whether the forcing variable is above or below the assignment threshold. In the sharp 
RDD framework, subsidy assignment can be considered locally random around the 
                                                            
3 These non-treated firms are willing to invest and have a valid investment project as checked by a preliminary 
screening. As a consequence, within each ranking, we can consider these firms as the best control group 
available; in fact, as suggested by Brown et al. (1995), they show a propensity for investment very similar to 
that of subsidized firms. 
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threshold of the forcing variable (Lee and Lemieux, 2010), here the sum of the five indicators 
normalized presented in Section 4. Then, any differences in outcomes between firms who 
are just below and just above the threshold can be attributed to the causal effect of the 
subsidies. 
To estimate the effect of subsidies on TFP components, we use an approach which 
takes into account the presence of many regional “calls for tender”. Therefore, we first re-
center each forcing variable threshold at zero, and then pool in the same ranking firms 
belonging to the same technological group. Indeed, the analysis is conducted separately for 
four industry sub-groups defined according to firms’ technology. Following Harris and 
Moffat (2013), industries were classified based mostly on Eurostat definitions, as high-tech 
(HT), medium high-tech (MHT), medium low-tech (MLT), and low-tech manufacturing 
firms (LT). Such a disaggregation is necessary because different sectors will operate with 
different production technologies, and the impact of capital subsidies on TFP is therefore 
likely to differ across sectors (Moffat, 2014). As L488 was directed also at a subset of non-
manufacturing firms (NM), we include them in a separate analysis.4 We then run the 
following equation: 
   0 1        SRDDirt rt ir rt ir ir ir irty a b x D b x D             (5) 
where irty  is the TFP component (TC, SC, AE, TE, or TFP) of the ith firm at time t (t:1,…,5) 
in technological group r (HT, MHT, MLT, LT, and NM), irx  is the forcing variable (in our 
                                                            
4 The non-manufacturing category is made up by wholesale trade and commission trade, real estate activities, 
computer and related activities, sewage and refuse disposal activities and recreational, cultural and sporting 
activities. 
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case, irx  is the sum of the indicators normalized for firm i in technological group r), irD  is 
the binary indicator variable for treatment which is unity in case of treatment of firm i in 
technological group r and zero else, and irt  is the error term. The evaluation problem 
consists of estimating the local average treatment effect (LATE)5 SRDDrt  of the treatment 
(subsidy assignment) on the TFP components at time t in technological group r. The key 
identification assumption that underlies the RDD strategy is that 0(.)b  and 1(.)b  are smooth 
functions of irx . Under this assumption, the treatment effect 
SRDD
rt  is obtained by estimating 
the discontinuity in the empirical regression function at the point where the treatment 
variable switches from 0 to 1. 
Because of its local nature, RDD average treatment-effects estimators are usually 
constructed using local regression techniques. We follow standard practice and use local 
polynomial non-parametric regression to estimate the equation (5). This kernel-based 
estimator requires a bandwidth for implementation, with observations outside the 
bandwidth receiving zero weight in the estimation. We select an optimal bandwidth that 
minimizes mean-squared-error using the robust confidence intervals developed by 
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014b) and a triangular kernel.6 To check the robustness 
of the results, we also use a parametric estimator with a 3rd order polynomial in the forcing 
variable, which is allowed to differ on the left and the right of the cut-off point to account 
for non-linearity in the outcome variable. 
                                                            
5 While the ATT gives the average treatment effect for the treated firms, in the sharp RDD framework the 
LATE gives the average treatment effect for those firms ranked around the assignment threshold. 
6 See Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a) for more details on the implementation of the RDD estimates 
and the Stata module rdrobust.ado. 
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After estimating the causal effect of L488 with respect to each TFP component via the 
RDD for each of the technological groups of firms, we aggregate the treatment effects to 
obtain the global treatment effect of the policy under analysis.7 The aggregation of different 
estimates is not a trivial problem because it is not easy to find an objective criterion to choose 
the weights of the estimates. For non-parametric estimates, we use the number of treated 
firms in each ranking with a forcing variable value within the optimal bandwidth selector 
(see Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014b);8 however, in Section 6, we check the robustness 
of this aggregation procedure. 
As a result, the global LATE of L488 ( )t
MRDD  and the standard errors ( )t  at time t 
are computed as follows: 
* /MRDDt r rt
r TechGro
SR
up
DDN N 

  ;         (6) 
2 2 2* /t r rt
r TechGroup
N N 

  ;          (7) 
where, SRDDrt  represents treatment in technological group r at time t, rt  is the standard error 
of the LATE estimate in technological group r at time t, rN  is the number of treated firms 
inside the bandwidth interval in technological group r, and N  is the total number of treated 
firms inside the bandwidth interval. 
4. Data 
                                                            
7 In order to reduce the influence of extreme values, we recoded the extreme values of each dependent variable 
to lowest or highest reasonable values (the value of the 2nd centile and the value of the 98th centile, respectively). 
The truncation procedure was used for all tables reporting MRDD estimates. 
8 For parametric estimates, we still use the number of treated firms in each ranking, but they are not limited to 
the observations within the optimal bandwidth selector. 
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L488 has been the main policy instrument for reducing territorial disparities in Italy 
during the period 1996-2007. L488 operates in the less-developed areas of Italy, i.e., the areas 
designated as Obj. 1, 2 or 5b for the purpose of EU Structural Funds. L488 has financed firms 
in both the Center-North (Objective 2 or 5b) and South regions (Objective 1) of the country;9 
however, Objective 1 regions receive transfers that are substantially higher in magnitude 
than transfers under all other lines of the EU’s Structural Funds program (Becker et al., 
2013).10 This is why our focus is on the southern regions; nevertheless, Section 5.4 reports a 
separate analysis for the firms localized in the Center-North regions.  
L488 makes available grants on capital account for projects designed to build new 
productive units in less-developed areas or to increase production capacity and 
employment, increase productivity or improve ecological conditions associated with 
productive processes, technological updates, restructuring, relocation and reactivation. 
After receiving an application form that includes a technical report and a business plan, the 
relevant authority performs a preliminary screening, evaluating the funding eligibility of 
the project. The amounts awarded are paid out in three equal instalments. L488 allocates 
subsidies through a rationing system based on regional competitive auctions. In each 
auction, the investment projects are ranked with respect to five objectives and 
predetermined criteria: 1) the share of owners’ funds in total investment; 2) the new job 
                                                            
9 In the southern regions, L488 has been financed not only with national funds but also with the EU Structural 
Funds (the southern regions were the only eight Objective 1 Italian regions in the 1994-1999 cycle of EU 
regional policies). 
10 In particular, for the L488, the medium-large subsidized firms located in Objective 2 or 5b areas received 
capital grants that support up to 10-20% of the total investment expenditures, but the medium-large 
subsidized firms located in Objective 1 areas received capital grants that support up to 40-50% of the total 
investment expenditures (plus an additional 15% for small firms). 
18 
 
creation by unit of investment; 3) the ratio between the subsidy requested by the firm and 
the highest subsidy applicable; 4) a score related to the priorities of the region in relation to 
location, project type and sector; 5) a score related to the environmental impact of the 
project. The criteria carry equal weight: the values related to each criterion are normalized, 
standardized and added up to produce a single score that determines the place of the project 
in the regional ranking (this normalized score is the forcing variable). The rankings are 
drawn up in decreasing order of the score awarded to each project, and the subsidies are 
allocated to projects until funding granted to each region is exhausted.	Several checks are 
made to establish whether subsidized firms have respected their targets. If a treated firm 
does not reach its goals, the subsidy is entirely or partially revoked. 
L488 auctions have been conducted on a yearly basis. Our analysis refers to the period 
1995-2003 and focuses on three of the four L488 auctions that were taken up by 1998.11 This 
time-span makes it possible to analyze the TFP disaggregation dynamics for the 5 years 
following the subsidy assignment. The data for the auctions derive from two datasets: the 
administrative L488 dataset of the Ministry of Economic Development, a financial statement 
dataset that collects data from AIDA,12 and other sources of financial information.13 After 
                                                            
11 Firms subsidized in auction 2 received the first installment in July 1997, while firms subsidized in auctions 
3 and 4 received the first installment in October 1998 and May 1999, respectively. Then each subsidized firm 
received the remaining installments in the following two years. However, in many cases, administrative 
complications and technical and economic problems have increased the time span of the project (estimated at 
3.6 years by Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011). 
12 AIDA is a large dataset that contains the budgets delivered by a subset (mostly corporate enterprises) of 
over 500,000 Italian firms to the Chambers of Commerce. 
13 The estimation results we present below rely on the assumption that there are no other governmental 
programs correlated with the allocation of L488 funding. Actually, a feature of L488 minimizes the extent of 
this bias by requiring that firms that apply for the incentives renounce any other public subsidies even without 
any guarantee of receiving the L488 funds. Besides, a recent study (Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2015) shows some 
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cleaning and merging the data, we have 1074 firms localized in the South (377 in the 
treatment group and 697 in the control group) and 800 firms localized in the Center-North 
(264 in the treatment group and 536 in the control group), which applied for the L488 funds 
in at least one of the auctions considered (auction 2, auction 3, and auction 4).14 Exploiting 
the MRDD features, we have tested whether the pre-treatment characteristics of the 
financed firms are similar to those of the control group. As shown in Table 1, we find no 
evidence of statistically significant pre-treatment differences at 5% level around the cut-off 
point between subsidized and non-subsidized firms in terms of each TFP component and 
other firm-related covariates. This holds for each technological group and for the aggregated 
sample.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
modest evidence of negative spillover effects reporting how the employment growth in subsidized firms is in 
part determined to the detriment of the untreated firms. However, there is no evidence of substantial spillovers 
concerning turnover, investment, and TFP. The latter finding mitigates the risk of a substantial violation of the 
Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) assumption (Rubin, 1986), which would cast doubts on 
the validity of our results. 
14 We considered only firms which had been operating since at least 2 years before the subsidy assignment, 
whereas we excluded projects that presented anomalies and irregularities. Concerning duplicate projects, i.e., 
applications for more than one auction, we decided to exclude the non-financed projects if the referring firm 
had already received L488 funds in a previous auction. 
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5. Results 
5.1 Production frontiers estimates 
The components of the TFP change were estimated within an SFA framework. The 
frontier models are specified for panel data, with both a stochastic frontier production 
function and a technical inefficiency model (Battese and Coelli, 1995). In particular, a flexible 
functional form as the translog production function is used:15  
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where ln ity  is the natural logarithm of the value added of firm i in year t and ln kitx  is the 
logarithm of input k, where k = L, K represent the two inputs, cost of labor and fixed assets, 
respectively.16 The production frontier may shift over time according to the values of the 
parameters t  and 2t . The itv s  are random variables that are assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed 2(0; )VN  , while the technical inefficiency variables ( itu ) are 
assumed to be independently distributed, such that itu  is the truncation (at zero) of the 
                                                            
15 For a detailed discussion of the model selection, parameter estimates and specification tests, see Appendix 
A. 
16 AIDA does not contain information about human capital, preventing us to control the production frontier 
for this potential input. Assuming that human capital may be proxied by the average wage (i.e., defined as the 
ratio between the cost of labor and the number of employees), we verify that there are not significant 
differences among firms classified with respect to the technological level. This finding suggests that human 
capital might not capture significant differences in the production process of firms. We thank an anonymous 
Reviewer for underlying this issue. 
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2( ; )itN    distribution. It is also assumed that the itv s  and itu s  are independent among each 
other.  
Following Battese and Coelli (1992), it  may be assumed as a function of observable 
explanatory variables. To account for time-varying technical inefficiency, we suggest 
modeling itu  by means of yearly dummy variables _ tD year  as 
0  _  it t t it
t
D year w               (9) 
where i  are the unknown parameters and itw  is a random error term.  
To account for the different technological sets within the industries, several frontiers 
were estimated separately. First, we considered firms applying to the different Auctions as 
separate groups; within each Auction, we also distinguished firms operating in the Center 
and North of Italy from those located in the South. The choice was motivated by either the 
specific characteristics of each auction or distinctive features of L488 in the Center-North 
regions. Furthermore, the industry sub-groups defined in Section 3.2 were considered.17 A 
detailed definition of all variables used in the estimated frontier models is reported in Table 
A1 of Appendix A. 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the stochastic frontier model 
for the different auction groups confirm heterogeneity in the production function due to the 
auction as well as firms’ technology (see Table A2 and Table A3 of Appendix A; all other 
model estimates are available upon request from the authors). Likelihood ratio (LR) tests 
confirm the identification of 18 firm groups, corresponding to different production frontiers. 
                                                            
17 High-tech (HT) and medium high-tech (MHT) firms were pooled because of small sample size issues. 
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5.2 Estimates of TFP decomposition  
The TFP and its components were calculated by using the estimated frontiers and the 
Divisia decomposition illustrated in Section 3.1, for every firm and period. In particular, 
having estimated the translog frontier function in equation (8) the technical efficiency level 
of firm i at time t ( itTE ) is calculated as the ratio of the actual output to the potential output 
as 
itu
itTE e
                                                                                         (10) 
The elasticity of output with respect to the kth input is obtained by 
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and RTS is calculated as RTS = K L  . 
Then, the scale of production (SC) and allocative efficiency (AE) are estimated 
respectively as 
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Finally, the rate of TC is defined by  
KtKtLtLttt xxtTC lnln2                                                    (14) 
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In the estimation of equations (11-14), output elasticities and TC are functions of input 
levels and are estimated at the sample means of input levels. 
Because each auction operates on a different time span, we identified some typical 
dates, using as the first period the year when the firm starts to receive the grant (i.e., the fifth 
period corresponds to four years after the first-year installment). This strategy makes it 
possible to correctly aggregate and compare TFP components across auctions, irrespective 
of the calendar years.  
Table 2 shows the average values of the TFP growth rate components for both treated 
and non-treated firms located in the South of Italy and separately for each technology 
level.18,19 On the whole, the analysis reveals a slight decay of TFP in non-treated firms across 
all the periods. Treated firms reduce TFP until the third year after the subsidy is granted; 
while TFP improves by 2% in the fourth year, the increase is positive but negligible in the 
last period. The growth in treated firms, when decomposed, is mainly due to TC and AE. 
More specifically, the TC index grows by 1.15% during the first year after the subsidy is 
granted and rises to 5.81% in the fifth period. This indicates that firms adopt technologies 
that allow them to be more productive. In addition, non-treated firms grow over the period, 
but with lower intensity (0.8 – 4.0%). The allocative inefficiency results when factor prices 
are not equal to their marginal product. The estimates of AE for treated firms show the 
                                                            
18 All results, related to auctions, size, geographical area and technological sets, are available upon request 
from the authors. 
19 The complexity of the analysis limits the analytic derivation of the standard errors of estimates reported in 
Table 2. Indeed, these estimates are obtained by combining frontier parameter estimates with input mean 
values. Being the frontier parameters all statistically significant at the 1% level, we are confident that all the 
estimates presented in Table 2 are statistically different from 0. We thank an anonymous Reviewer for 
underlying this point. 
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existence of allocative inefficiency in the years immediately after the grants, while in the last 
part of the observed period, AE turns out to be positive, indicating the presence of 
adjustment lags and connected to market effects for the subsidized firms. Conversely, 
untreated firms show a continuous decline in their AE for all periods. The contribution of 
TE is relevant but negative for all the firms and over (almost) all the periods; the intensity is 
slightly higher in the sample of treated firms. This decrease may be caused either by internal 
cost of adjustment (organizational changes) or by transaction costs arising from the 
adoption of the new quantity of inputs. Conversely, the SC effect is negligible, for both 
treated and untreated firms. The expected boost of capital subsidies on scale efficiency, due 
to the new capital and consequent additional employees, has not been realized.  
Insert Table 2 
This evidence suggests that subsidized capital does not really increase the scale of 
operation, but it substitutes the capital to be invested by the firm under conditions of no 
subsidization. Being that the SC is similar between granted and not financed firms, it may 
be attributed to a simple extrapolation of past trends and not to the effect of subsidization.  
These effects are quite similar between the different technological groups but with 
different intensities. TC is higher for firms operating in the low-technology industries, 
suggesting that in the observed period, all these firms (i.e., treated and untreated firms) have 
improved their technology. Conversely, non-manufacturing firms show the lowest TC 
effect, which becomes null for the untreated firms of these industries. Medium-high and 
high-technological firms show a continuous decline in TFP, mainly due to a negative effect 
of AE for all the periods. 
 
25 
 
 
 
5.3 Multiple RDD estimates 
In this section we compute point estimates and standard errors of the effects of 
subsidies on each TFP component for the South of Italy.20 Columns from (1) to (5) of Table 
3 report the MRDD non-parametric estimates for the effect of the subsidies on each TFP 
component for each of the five years following the subsidy assignment; while columns from 
(6) to (10) report the MRDD parametric estimates. Formula (5) is used to derive all RDD 
estimates, while Formulae (6) and (7) are used to aggregate them and obtain the global LATE 
of L488 with the corresponding standard errors. For all coefficients, a positive sign means 
that the subsidy assignment has a positive effect on the TFP component, while a negative 
sign means the opposite. Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 90% statistical 
confidence level are marked with one asterisk; those significant at the 95% level with two 
asterisks; those significant at the 99% level with three asterisks. The estimates should be 
interpreted as the percent change in TFP component between treated and untreated firms, 
e.g. a coefficient of 0.01 corresponds to a 1% increase of the TFP component in the treated 
relative to the control firms. 
                                                            
20 Before adopting the MRDD, we used the coarsened exact matching technique (see Iacus et al., 2011), which 
is a formal preliminary matching procedure to produce better balanced treatment and comparison groups. In 
particular, we matched exactly on three pre-treatment variables (tangible capital, labor cost per employee, and 
ROE) using their tertiles as cut-points. This data-preprocessing technique led to the loss of a limited number 
of observations (about 2%). Besides, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), we subtract from each dependent 
variable its pre-treatment value. This is done because differenced outcomes should have a sufficiently lower 
variance than the level of the outcome to lower the variance in the RDD estimator. 
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The most interesting result relates to the difference in TFP growth between 
subsidized and non-subsidized firms: considering the non-parametric approach, in the first 
three years the difference is negative, indicating that TFP grows more in non-subsidized 
firms; on the contrary, over the last two years, TFP growth is greater in subsidized firms, 
with a differential equal, on average, to approximately 9%. This differential is significant 
from a statistical point of view in the first two years (at 5%, with negative coefficients), less 
so in the remaining years.21 Therefore, there are signals that dynamics of TFP growth rate 
in subsidized firms could be linked to the process of learning and concluding the 
implementation of the investment. The sign reversal also could explain the mixed results 
achieved in the literature. The decomposition analysis allows us to identify the components 
that are responsible for this sign reversal. 
In the first place, the TC component gives a positive contribution to the TFP growth 
gap: in subsidized firms, the growth rate of TC is always higher than in non-subsidized 
firms, and the differential is statistically significant for two out of five years. On the other 
hand, the contribution of TE is always negative and statistically significant for two out of 
five years. The contribution of SC is mixed and always not statistically significant. Finally, 
the contribution of AE switches sign during the period: it is negative in the first two years 
and positive in the last three years (it is strongly statistically significant in year 4). The results 
using the parametric approach are basically the same, even if slightly less statistically 
significant.22 
                                                            
21 Note that a similar coefficient pattern emerges when considering different subgroups of firms and following 
various robustness tests reported in Section 6. 
22 Estimation of the parametric model using the 1st or the 2nd order polynomials in the forcing variable leads 
to quantitatively similar estimates. 
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The results suggest that public subsidies could help firms to improve their 
technological assets, mostly by increasing the technological content embedded in the (new) 
capital. The new capital bought with incentives augments the rate of technological progress 
of the firm. It is plausible that the TC component incorporates some element of technical 
efficiency, which could be underestimated in subsidized firms. Moreover, during the 5-year 
period, the firm adjusts the production factors to be more efficient: actually, if in the first 
years the subsidized firm chooses not to pursue allocative efficiency because a higher 
intensity in the use of one factor (for instance, labor) could increase the chance to obtain the 
subsidy, in the following years, the firm has the opportunity to move toward a more efficient 
configuration. However, these technological improvements are slow in offsetting the 
negative impact, due to complexity in the management of the new resources. The overall 
effects of subsidies on TFP in the medium term are slightly negative: after a sizable drop 
during the first three years, there is a clear trend reversal in TFP in years 4 and 5.  
The results are similar also for the subsample of small firms (Table 4). The differences 
in TFP growth rate in the last two years are slightly larger (10%), whereas the differences in 
the technological progress growth rate are smaller and statistically not significant. The scale 
component is interesting; in this case, it is negative and statistically significant. A plausible 
interpretation is that using the subsidies, the firms move toward market niches, which are 
more profitable but where the scale economies are unfeasible or not essential. 
Insert Table 3 
Insert Table 4 
Looking at the productivity differential by technological sector, we find that the 
differential in TFP for the low-tech manufacturing firms is higher than the average in the 
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last two years (more than the 14%), even if not statistically significant. The differential in AE 
is very high in the last two years, where the TC growth rate differential is also positive only 
in the same period. Both explain the higher TFP growth differential. For the medium-low, 
medium-high and high-tech firms the picture is different. The TFP growth of subsidized 
firms is higher with respect to non-subsidized firms only in the fourth year (third and fourth 
years for the medium-low tech firms). Even if the contribution of the TC component is 
always positive, the contribution of AE is lower and sometimes negative. In the non-
manufacturing firms, the TFP growth differential is positive in the last two years but lower 
than the average (5%). In addition, the positive contribution of TC is lower than the 
average.23 
The conclusion of the analysis is that the TFP differential is basically dominated by 
two factors: TC and AE. In sectors where the TC growth induced by the subsidies through 
new capital overcomes the negative effect on TE (related to the new enterprise organization 
and management, entry in new market and so on), the TFP tends to be positive. However, 
this is realized when the impact of the AE differential induced by the subsidies becomes 
positive. The subsidized firms, usually after three years, are able to make a more efficient 
use of the productive factors finally exploiting the new capital. On the other hand, in sectors 
where the TC gain is lower or the AE catch-up is modest the impact of the subsidies on TFP 
is nil or negative.   
 
5.4 What effects on TFP had the subsidies to firms located in the Center-North regions? 
                                                            
23 The estimates by technological sector are available upon request from the authors. 
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We also estimated the effect of the L488 on TFP for the firms located in the Center-
North regions, which are much wealthier that the regions in the South, after testing for 
statistically significant pre-treatment differences (see Table B1 of Appendix B). The areas 
where the firms could apply for the L488 subsidies were small (limited to few provinces) 
and the intensity of the subsidies was much lower than in the South. Therefore, we expect 
that the impact of L488 in these areas was less important. Actually, the differences in TFP 
growth between subsidized and not subsidized firms are statistically not significant (Table 
B2 of Appendix B). The impact on TFP growth differential is positive in four years out of 
five. The same is also true for technical efficiency. Technical growth and allocative efficiency 
are always positive. Estimates of TFP by technology for the firms located in the Center-
North regions are affected by the smaller sample dimension. However, TFP growth 
differentials are always positive and often statistically significant in medium-low tech 
manufacturing firms, where the main contribution comes from improvement in the 
allocative efficiency, and mostly in non-manufacturing sectors, where it is important the 
contribution of scale economies. In the other sectors the picture is more complex, however 
the effects are negligible. 
 
6. Robustness  
We assess the validity and the robustness of our results on the South adopting 
various specification tests. First, we use a falsification test of the RDD named McCrary test 
(McCrary, 2008). One often violated criterion for a valid RDD is that the density of the 
forcing variable be smooth on either side of the discontinuity. The violation of this condition 
suggests that the score may be manipulated in ways that bias estimates of impact. In our 
context, the RDD analysis requires that the normalized score density be smooth on either 
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side of the subsidy assignment threshold. The McCrary test is implemented as a Wald test 
of the null hypothesis that the discontinuity is zero and it fails to reject for each ranking. In 
Figure C1 of Appendix C we graphically present the negative results of this test in the 
rankings split by auction and by technological group. 
Additionally, we assess the robustness of our parametric results by estimating the 
models on a “narrow-band” sample around the cut-off, equal to the optimal bandwidth 
above and below the cut-off. These parametric estimates are very close to those reported in 
the paper. Moreover, as valid estimates based on the Multiple RDD rely on the assumption 
that the discontinuity in the outcome can be attributed to the discontinuity in treatment, we 
tested if there were jumps in the value of other exogenous covariates at the cut-off point. No 
variables showed a significant jump at the discontinuity. 
We also need to check if the adoption of another weighting procedure will deliver 
different estimates. To do so, we adopt the weighting by inverse variance, which gives more 
weight to the LATE estimates with smaller variances. Formulae (15) and (16) reported 
below, show how MRDDt  and t  are computed: 
2 2( *1/ ) / ( 1/ )MRDD SRDDt rt rt rt
r TechGroup r TechGroup
   
 
   ;       (15) 
21/ ( 1/ )t rt
r TechGroup
 

  .          (16) 
Table C1 of Appendix C shows that this weighting scheme produces estimates very 
close to the ones reported in Table 3. 
Finally, to investigate the role of the technical inefficiency modeling, we also 
considered the time-variant specification of itu  proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992), which 
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is reported in equation (A4) of Appendix A. Table C2 reports the Multiple RDD estimates 
using the dynamic specification of itu ; the results show no relevant differences with respect 
to the baseline estimates, except for the absence of statistically significant effects for TE using 
the non-parametric estimator. 
7. Conclusions 
Understanding the effects of the subsidy policies for private firms is crucial to 
assessing the effectiveness of public actions to stimulate regional growth. In fact, regional 
policies that do not lead to an increase in productivity and thus competitiveness are destined 
to fail in the long run. The purposes of this article were to analyze the impact of a regional 
policy on TFP growth and decompose the effect among technological change, scale 
component, technical or allocative efficiency.  
The main new element of our analysis is the evaluation design, based on a quasi-
experimental approach (Multiple RRD) that allows capturing the causal effect of the 
subsidies on TFP and its components. Therefore, investigating the estimated effects for five 
years after the assignment of the subsidies, we can identify the way subsidies can positively 
affect TFP and determine the processes by which the incentives act on the productivity and 
efficiency of subsidized firms. 
The main findings from the case study are twofold. First, results show that capital 
subsidies negatively affect TFP growth in the short term, and signals of positive effects 
appear only after 3-4 years. The negative short term and the positive medium-long term 
impact can be explained by several reasons: time to learn, time to stay in a larger market, 
time to adjust factor proportion, the sluggishness in the effects of technological progress. 
The analysis can explain the differences from the previous literature on L488; actually, the 
effects on productivity are negative or negligible in several papers on this policy instrument 
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(Bronzini and De Blasio, 2006; Bernini and Pellegrini, 2011; Bondonio and Martini, 2012; 
Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2014). However, none of these studies perform such a long year-by-
year analysis. Indeed, the effects become positive only after the third year (in the South). In 
Bernini and Pellegrini (2011), it was noted that firms subsidized by L488 could overshoot 
the optimal amount of employment to gain a subsidy. It is plausible that after the third year, 
firms start to reduce the inflated employment and increase allocative efficiency. 
Second, the positive impact comes especially through technological change and not 
through scale impact change, as may have been expected. Following the framework 
presented by Beason and Weinstein (1996) and Skuras et al. (2006), where industrial policies 
are classified as Schumpeterian when subsidies aim to support technological progress or 
Marshallian when subsidies assist economies of scale and/or infant industries, our results 
support the conclusion that capital subsidies present Schumpeterian and not Marshallian 
effects on regional growth. This is also the conclusion of Skuras et al. (2006). Therefore, the 
main channel of the impact of capital subsidies on TFP is through increasing the 
technological content of the new capital, which sustains the technological upgrade of the 
subsidized firm. 
In conclusion, the result suggested in the previous literature, that the increase in 
capital stock does not necessarily entail efficient and productive subsidized firms, is only 
partially confirmed by our empirical evidence, and just in the first years of investment. Even 
if in the short term firms are induced to overshoot the optimal amount of employment to 
gain the subsidy, in the long run they can adjust the factor proportion and, sustained by the 
new technology embedded in the new capital, can achieve long-run efficiency and growth. 
The analysis of the relationship between subsidy intensities and TFP growth showed that 
this is especially true for micro and small firms. However, the topic of how the increase in 
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TFP can influence the competitiveness of subsidized firms in the global economy is left for 
future research. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A. Production frontier estimates and specification tests 
The stochastic frontier model in (8) is appealing for TFP decomposition as it is quite 
flexible and it allows for non-neutral technological change. TC is said to be k-input using 
(saving) if kt  is positive (negative); and TC is neutral if all kt s  (k = L, K) are equal to zero. 
If all s  are equal to zero ( 0LL KK LK tt Lt Kt           ), the production function 
reduces to the Cobb-Douglas function with neutral TC.  Details on variables definition, 
measurement and expected effects in the production function are presented in Table A1. 
Insert Table A1 
Another interesting feature regards the capability to model the technical 
inefficiencies itu  which are assumed to be distributed as the truncation (at zero) of the 
2( ; )itN    distribution, where it  is a function of observable explanatory variables and 
unknown parameters. There are several specifications to account for time-varying technical 
inefficiencies itu  (Kumbhakar, 2000) which can be used in the TFP decomposition. Battese 
and Coelli (1995) proposed a specification for the technical inefficiency effect in the 
stochastic frontier production function 
it 0 it itz  w                          (A1) 
where itz  are observable variables assumed to influence the inefficiency of firm i at time t, 
s  are parameters to be estimated and the random variable itw  is defined by the truncation 
of the normal distribution with zero mean and variance 2 . 
41 
 
 Replacing itz  by t (time trend), the technical inefficiency function itu  can be defined 
as 
it
2
210it
 t  wt                       (A2) 
 where the time trend variable controls for time varying, systematic unobserved factors. 
Alternately, yearly dummy variables _ tD year  can be used; then, the model for the 
inefficiency term becomes  
itt t0it
 _ wyearD t                  (A3) 
Following Battese and Coelli (1992), the technical inefficiency component can also be 
considered time-variant assuming that 
 ( ( ))t Tit iu e u
  , 0itu  , i: 1, .., N,  t ∈ τ(i)                 (A4) 
where τ(i) represents the Ti periods of time for which we have available observations for the 
ith firm among the available T periods in the panel (i.e., τ(i) may contain all periods in the 
panel or only a subset of periods). η represents the rate of change of technical inefficiency 
over time; the sign of η dictates the behavior of technical inefficiency over time.  
To note that the parameters η in equation (A4) and s  in equation (A2 and A3) are assumed 
to be the same for all firms in the sample, which means that the pattern of inefficiency rise 
or reduction is the same for all firms. Some generalizations have been provided in literature, 
as  
itwtu  22i1i0iit t            (A5) 
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where 2i1i0i  ,  ,   are producer-specific parameters (Cornwell et al., 1990). Since time 
appears in a linear fashion as a regressor in the production function, as well as in itu , all the 
parameters associated with the time variable in the production function and in itu  cannot, 
in general, be identified. Then, this specification prevents to separate the effects of 
technological change and productivity change, limiting its applicability in the 
decomposition of TFP.  
In the analysis, we suggest using yearly dummy variables _ tD year  to model the 
inefficiency term itt t0it  _ wyearD t    . The use of this approach in modeling the 
time-varying inefficiency is appealing and well adapts to TFP decomposition. First, this 
specification allows a greater flexibility compared with the use of deterministic time trends 
or a time invariant specification. Second, our interest is in modeling the inefficiency term 
over time and disentangling time-varying inefficiency from dynamics in the production 
frontier. Models (8) and (A3) allow to specify different dynamics for the frontier and the 
inefficiency; while the true fixed/random estimators proposed by Greene (2005a,b), which 
are the main competing approaches used in empirical analyses, do not. Moreover, the 
Greene estimators suffer of the incidental parameters problem (i.e., the estimator is 
appropriate only when the length of the panel is large enough, that is T≥10), preventing its 
use in our analysis (Greene, 2002). Differently from Battese and Coelli (1995), the Greene 
estimators allow disentangling unit specific time invariant unobserved heterogeneity from 
inefficiency.  
For a robustness check, we also present results of the Multiple RDD when model (A4) 
is used for the inefficiency term (see Table C2 of Appendix C). Results are similar to those 
obtained when the model (A3) is implemented. 
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The parameters of the frontier production function are simultaneously estimated 
with those of the inefficiency model ( 2 2, , , V    ), in which the technical inefficiency effects 
are specified as a function of yearly dummies (equations 8 and A3). Maximum likelihood 
estimates of the model parameters are obtained using the program, FRONTIER 4.1, written 
by Coelli (1996). The variance parameters are defined by 2 2 2S V     and 22 / S   
originally recommended by Battese and Corra (1977). The log-likelihood function of this 
model is presented in the appendix of Battese and Coelli (1993). When the variance 
associated with the technical inefficiency effects converges toward zero (i.e. 2 0  ) then 
the ratio parameter,  , approaches zero. When the variance of the random error ( 2v ) 
decreases in size, relative to the variance associated with the technical inefficiency effects, 
the value of   approaches one.  
The problem of endogeneity in stochastic frontier analysis has been largely discussed 
in the literature (Amsler et al., 2016). Dealing with endogeneity in our context is not a simple 
issue because the usual Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for the standard stochastic 
frontier model is harder to generalize and the non-linearity of the translog frontier function 
largely complicates the procedure. Then, we leave the treatment of endogeneity to future 
research.24 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in the panel translog stochastic 
frontier production function for the different auction groups are given in Table A2. To verify 
for firms’ heterogeneity in the production frontier in each auction, initially the specification 
                                                            
24 However, we investigate for the possible presence of endogeneity in our production frontier. In particular, 
we explore the presence of Granger-causality between production factors (capital and labor) and value added 
within the framework of a VAR model for panel data. The test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of Granger-
causality of value added in both labor and capital equations. 
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of model (8) has been enlarged and a set of controlling variables (in the form of dummy 
variables) have been introduced. In particular, we investigate if firm dimension (D_micro, 
D_small, and D_medium_and_large), technological level (D_HT_and_MHT, D_MLT, D_LT, 
and D_NM), and region where firm resides (D_regioi, i: 1,..,17) have a significant influence 
on production. Coefficients have signs that conform to our expectations: we expected a 
positive sign if dimension and technological level increases (see Table A1). 
Insert Table A2 
In Table A3, the results of the various null hypothesis tests associated with the 
frontier specification and inefficiency effects are reported for the estimated frontiers. 
Hypotheses can be tested using the generalized likelihood ratio statistic,  , given by 
 ))(ln())(ln(2 10 HLHL  , where )( 0HL  and )( 1HL  denote the value of the likelihood 
function under the null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. If the given null hypothesis 
is true, then   has approximately a Chi-square (or a mixed Chi-square) distribution. If the 
null hypothesis involves 0  , then the asymptotic distribution involves a mixed Chi-
square distribution (Coelli, 1995). 
The first null hypothesis, 0 :  0  ,jkH j k   , that the Cobb-Douglas frontier is an 
adequate representation for firms, is strongly rejected by the data for the whole sample as 
well as for firms in the second auction. The second null hypothesis, 2 0  kt t kt      , 
that there is no TC, is always rejected.  
Insert Table A3 
We also check, separately, for the presence of neutral TC and other biased TC. The 
neutral TC leaves the ratio of inputs constant and shifts the production frontier in parallel 
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and outwards. The biased TC is the technological change embedded in at least one of the 
inputs; it changes the slope of the production frontier and shifts it outwards. The rejection 
of tests of the null hypotheses 2 0t t    and 0  kkt    indicate the presence of both two-
dimensional technological changes. On average, over the sample period, investment in fixed 
assets negatively affects the frontier, shifting it downwards; while, on the contrary, labor 
force positively contributes to an upward movement of the frontier. This means that, on 
average, firms make lower productive use of fixed assets in their production and a higher 
productive use of their labor force. 
As regards the model efficiency, the LR test of the one sided error for the null 
hypothesis ii   0  of no technical inefficiency is strongly rejected for all the models. 
The LR tests are in fact equal to 420.564, 449.620, and 388.747 for the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th action 
respectively, which exceeds the corresponding upper five per cent point for the mixed Chi-
square distribution (Kodde and Palm, 1986). The value of the estimates of the   parameters 
are higher than 0.93 for all the models which implies that a significant proportion of the total 
variability is associated with technical inefficiency of production.  
Finally, we plot the distribution of the technical efficiencies for the three auctions 
(Figure A1). The plots are quite similar, with a thin tail to the left of the distribution, 
gradually rising to a maximum in the 0.8 to 0.9 interval and then dropping sharply in the 
0.9 to 1.0 interval. The fact that the mode of the distribution is not in this final interval 
supports the use of the truncated normal distributions for the inefficiency effects (Battese 
and Coelli, 1996), representing a generalization of other distributional forms (Meesters, 
2014). 
Insert Figure A1 
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Based on these results, we account for the different technological sets within the 
industries by estimating several frontiers separately. First, we considered firms applying to 
the different auctions as separate groups; within each auction, we also separated firms 
operating in the Center-North of Italy from those located in the South. Furthermore, four 
industry sub-groups defined according to firms’ technology were considered (Harris and 
Moffat, 2013). Then, 18 firm groups were identified and 18 production frontier models 
estimated (8 for auction 3; 5 for both auctions 2 and 4). LR tests support our identification 
strategy, strongly rejecting the null hypothesis of homogenous production functions among 
the above groups (LR tests are 539.89 (p-value=0.00), 920.47 (p-value=0.00), and 480.89 (p-
value=0.00) for the auction groups 2, 3 and 4, respectively). 
 
 
Appendix B. Policy effects in the Center-North regions 
Insert Table B1 
Insert Table B2 
 
 
Appendix C. Robustness tests 
Insert Table C1 
Insert Table C2 
Insert Figure C1 
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Table 1. Multiple RDD estimates of the pre-treatment differences in TFP components 
and other covariates between subsidized and non-subsidized firms (SOUTH) 
 SOUTH REGIONS 
Dependent variable Low tech Medium-low tech 
Medium-high 
and high tech 
Non-
manufacturing Whole sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Technological Change -0.00301 0.00052 -0.02425 -0.03124 -0.00756 
(0.00948) (0.00736) (0.03174) (0.02270) (0.00684) 
Scale Component -0.00567 -0.01583 0.01283 0.01308 -0.00528 
(0.00987) (0.00852)* (0.01304) (0.02339) (0.00580) 
Allocative Efficiency 0.03011 -0.03065 0.11052 -0.02342 0.01170 
(0.06324) (0.07835) (0.14312) (0.05784) (0.04513) 
Technical Efficiency 0.03965 0.04929 -0.00014 0.08031 0.04149 
(0.02863) (0.04406) (0.07618) (0.05862) (0.02640) 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
0.06863 0.04470 0.12050 -0.00403 0.05825 
(0.09140) (0.09956) (0.15467) (0.07949) (0.05579) 
      
Tangible Capital -346.34 -1144.92 137.50 -441.81 -661.32 
(467.51) (733.04) (579.09) (405.99) (359.15)* 
Value Added 200.47 -1110.81 195.31 57.59 -357.31 
(337.93) (647.75)* (464.03) (481.22) (275.66) 
Labor Cost per 
Employee 
2941.45 1570.89 -834.03 -3396.91 848.15 
(1611.03)* (1646.25) (2880.67) (2735.46) (1019.65) 
# Employees -1.67 -22.70 5.83 4.65 -10.50 
(11.12) (14.38) (14.70) (11.84) (7.22) 
ROE -4.10 2.11 -2.38 16.06 0.66 
(9.85) (13.72) (14.83) (10.88) (7.05) 
Net liabilities -958.01 -1820.73 707.36 -140.52 -916.55 
(501.23)* (1085.59)* (559.55) (343.31) (481.35)* 
Cash Flow -70.78 -323.52 142.15 -157.65 -149.64 
 (120.43) (239.25) (250.27) (198.15) (110.58) 
Note: For the aggregated estimates (5) we used the weighting scheme based on the number of treated firms 
within the optimal bandwidth. Results are from local linear regression with triangular kernel using the 
robust confidence intervals and CCT implementation of mean-squared-error optimal bandwidth selector 
developed by Calonico, Cattaneo & Titiunik (2014b). Estimation is implemented in the Stata package 
rdrobust by Calonico, Cattaneo & Titiunik (2014a). Bias is estimated with a quadratic polynomial. 95% robust 
confidence intervals are in brackets. Monetary values are expressed in constant euros, year 2000. Significant 
at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
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Table 2. TFP components growth rates (SOUTH) 
 All firms 
 Treated  Not treated 
 TC SC AE TE TFP  TC SC AE TE TFP 
Year 1 0.0115 0.0006 -0.0615 -0.0358 -0.0831  0.0081 -0.0024 -0.0142 -0.0138 -0.0162 
Year 2 0.0217 -0.0014 -0.1064 -0.0252 -0.1086  0.0160 0.0026 -0.0259 -0.0056 -0.0137 
Year 3 0.0333 0.0050 -0.0331 -0.0379 -0.0349  0.0244 0.0059 -0.0400 -0.0294 -0.0393 
Year 4 0.0456 0.0045 0.0166 -0.0434 0.0238  0.0321 0.0053 -0.0303 -0.0233 -0.0156 
Year 5 0.0581 0.0084 0.0241 -0.0954 0.0035  0.0396 0.0143 -0.0376 -0.0884 -0.0787 
 Low-tech firms 
 Treated  Not treated 
 TC SC AE TE TFP  TC SC AE TE TFP 
Year 1 0.0176 -0.0016 -0.0398 -0.0462 -0.0551  0.0172 0.0001 -0.0161 -0.0480 -0.0274 
Year 2 0.0343 -0.0006 -0.1119 -0.0027 -0.0853  0.0351 0.0052 -0.0118 -0.0155 0.0058 
Year 3 0.0532 0.0064 -0.0095 -0.0524 -0.0084  0.0531 0.0113 -0.0360 -0.0393 -0.0181 
Year 4 0.0725 0.0053 0.0132 -0.0413 0.0517  0.0691 0.0095 -0.0463 -0.0303 0.0054 
Year 5 0.0924 0.0096 0.0244 -0.1557 -0.0283  0.0863 0.0123 -0.0182 -0.1450 -0.0702 
 Medium-low tech firms 
 Treated  Not treated 
 TC SC AE TE TFP  TC SC AE TE TFP 
Year 1 0.0086 -0.0029 -0.0460 -0.0215 -0.0690  0.0048 -0.0023 -0.0220 0.0174 0.0035 
Year 2 0.0170 -0.0064 -0.0457 -0.0257 -0.0471  0.0094 0.0000 -0.0234 0.0379 0.0277 
Year 3 0.0247 0.0005 -0.0301 -0.0447 -0.0522  0.0141 0.0023 -0.0627 -0.0256 -0.0675 
Year 4 0.0323 0.0023 0.0260 -0.0294 0.0277  0.0187 0.0045 -0.0311 0.0084 0.0023 
Year 5 0.0399 0.0080 0.0543 -0.0572 0.0558  0.0236 0.0092 -0.0534 -0.0596 -0.0815 
 Medium-high and high-tech firms 
 Treated  Not treated 
 TC SC AE TE TFP  TC SC AE TE TFP 
Year 1 0.0099 0.0059 -0.1344 -0.0519 -0.1734  0.0051 -0.0046 0.0194 -0.0542 -0.0469 
Year 2 0.0172 -0.0058 -0.1952 -0.0614 -0.2492  0.0091 -0.0015 -0.0471 -0.0779 -0.1149 
Year 3 0.0250 -0.0040 -0.1004 -0.0426 -0.1162  0.0137 -0.0026 -0.0162 -0.0633 -0.0760 
Year 4 0.0354 -0.0053 -0.0096 -0.0747 -0.0519  0.0189 0.0036 -0.0115 -0.0873 -0.0862 
Year 5 0.0452 0.0000 -0.0627 -0.0991 -0.0956  0.0223 0.0013 -0.0364 -0.1061 -0.1396 
 Non-manufacturing firms 
 Treated  Not treated 
 TC SC AE TE TFP  TC SC AE TE TFP 
Year 1 0.0027 0.0116 -0.0841 -0.0251 -0.0980  -0.0003 -0.0059 -0.0164 0.0086 -0.0191 
Year 2 0.0012 0.0176 -0.1612 -0.0488 -0.1905  -0.0014 0.0073 -0.0451 -0.0402 -0.0815 
Year 3 0.0062 0.0269 -0.0296 0.0373 0.0421  -0.0004 0.0101 -0.0088 0.0079 0.0166 
Year 4 0.0134 0.0220 0.0335 -0.0525 0.0215  -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0097 -0.0403 -0.0502 
Year 5 0.0213 0.0175 0.0435 -0.0139 0.0749  -0.0027 0.0417 -0.0386 -0.0311 -0.0423 
Note: Statistics computed only using the 536 observations (255 treated firms and 281 control firms) closest to 
the forcing variable threshold (scores within -1.5 and +1.5). Abbreviations: TC, technological change; SC, scale 
component; AE, allocative efficiency; TE, technical efficiency; TFP, total factor productivity. 
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Table 3. Non-parametric and parametric Multiple RDD estimates (SOUTH) 
 Weighting scheme: Number of treated firms within the optimal bandwidth 
 Non-parametric estimates  Parametric estimates 
Dependent 
variable 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Technological 
Change 
0.0040 0.0047 0.0053 0.0137 0.0212  0.0027 0.0024 0.0039 0.0103 0.0167 
(0.0024) (0.0043) (0.0063) (0.0080)* (0.0093)**  (0.0024) (0.0042) (0.0061) (0.0077) (0.0096)* 
Scale 
Component 
0.0049 -0.0086 -0.0057 0.0046 -0.0032  0.0089 0.0066 0.0041 0.0070 0.0038 
(0.0076) (0.0079) (0.0077) (0.0081) (0.0091)  (0.0083) (0.0094) (0.0079) (0.0083) (0.0090) 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
-0.0813 -0.1387 0.0256 0.1369 0.0833  -0.1069 -0.1331 0.0203 0.1080 0.0610 
(0.0545) (0.0653)** (0.0584) (0.0608)** (0.0555)  (0.0533)** (0.0618)** (0.0566) (0.0547)** (0.0539) 
Technical 
Efficiency 
-0.0501 -0.0120 -0.0550 -0.0022 -0.0663  -0.0488 -0.0300 -0.0474 -0.0075 0.0165 
(0.0372) (0.0407) (0.0326)* (0.0390) (0.0391)*  (0.0356) (0.0346) (0.0329) (0.0399) (0.0466) 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
-0.1549 -0.1736 -0.0237 0.1349 0.0465  -0.1380 -0.1546 -0.0090 0.1165 0.1170 
(0.0771)** (0.0853)** (0.0791) (0.0727)* (0.0855)  (0.0765)* (0.0775)** (0.0801) (0.0731)* (0.0855) 
Note: There are 1074 observations (377 treated firms and 697 control firms); however, for non-parametric estimates, the actual number of 
observations within the bandwidth ranges between 415 (205 T and 210 NT) and 544 (260 T and 284 NT) (it depends on the dependent variable and 
the year analyzed). Results are from local linear regression with triangular kernel using the robust confidence intervals and CCT implementation 
of mean-squared-error optimal bandwidth selector developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b). Estimation is implemented in the Stata 
package rdrobust by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a). Bias is estimated with a quadratic polynomial. 95% robust confidence intervals are 
in brackets. Parametric regressions include a third-order polynomial in the forcing variable. These functions are estimated on both sides of the 
threshold separately. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
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Table 4. Non-parametric and parametric Multiple RDD estimates (SOUTH) - Small firms 
 Weighting scheme: Number of treated firms within the optimal bandwidth 
 Non-parametric estimates  Parametric estimates 
Dependent 
variable 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Technological 
Change 
0.0026 0.0048 0.0093 0.0121 0.0183  -0.0029 -0.0091 -0.0073 -0.0115 -0.0150 
(0.0057) (0.0106) (0.0158) (0.0210) (0.0229)  (0.0043) (0.0088) (0.0123) (0.0169) (0.0207) 
Scale 
Component 
-0.0079 -0.0070 -0.0064 -0.0227 -0.0167  -0.0055 -0.0051 0.0004 -0.0135 -0.0059 
(0.0101) (0.0083) (0.0067) (0.0128)* (0.0079)**  (0.0088) (0.0079) (0.0065) (0.0094) (0.0067) 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
-0.0612 -0.0789 0.0324 0.1428 0.0913  -0.0475 -0.0478 0.0255 0.1404 0.0624 
(0.0526) (0.0623) (0.0689) (0.0537)*** (0.0550)*  (0.0490) (0.0587) (0.0563) (0.0507)*** (0.0519) 
Technical 
Efficiency 
-0.0885 -0.0568 -0.0616 -0.0135 -0.0968  -0.0467 -0.0094 -0.0031 0.0149 0.0170 
(0.0317)*** (0.0336)* (0.0368)* (0.0433) (0.0531)*  (0.0280)* (0.0316) (0.0318) (0.0424) (0.0486) 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
-0.1776 -0.1277 -0.0108 0.1303 0.0692  -0.1285 -0.0916 0.0411 0.1460 0.0827 
(0.0763)** (0.0690)* (0.0755) (0.0624)** (0.0836)  (0.0629)** (0.0660) (0.0679) (0.0665)** (0.0890) 
Note: There are 504 observations (169 treated firms and 335 control firms); however, for non-parametric estimates, the actual number of observations 
within the bandwidth ranges between 166 (86 T and 80 NT) and 265 (127 T and 138 NT) (it depends on the dependent variable and the year 
analyzed). Results are from local linear regression with a triangular kernel using the robust confidence intervals and CCT implementation of the 
mean-squared-error optimal bandwidth selector developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b). Estimation is implemented in the Stata 
package rdrobust by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a). Bias estimated with quadratic polynomial. 95% robust confidence intervals are in 
brackets. Parametric regressions include a third order polynomial in the forcing variable. These functions are estimated on both sides of the 
threshold separately. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. Production frontier estimates and specification tests 
 
Table A1. Variables information and measurement 
Variable Type Measurement Expected effects 
y Output Value added (€)  
x1 Labor input Cost of labor (€) + 
x2 Capital input Fixed Assets (€) + 
t Trend Time +/- 
D_yeart Trend Yearly dummies, t: 1,...,9 +/ - 
D_regior Covariate Regional dummies, r: 1,...,17 +/- 
D_micro 
D_small 
D_medium_and_large 
Covariate Firm size dummies + 
D_MHT_and_HT 
D_MLT 
D_LT 
Covariate Manufacturing technological level dummies + 
D_NM Covariate Non-manufacturing firms dummy +/- 
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Table A2. Maximum Likelihood estimates for parameters of the stochastic frontier with 
inefficiency effects model  
Coefficient Auction 2 Auction 3 Auction 4 
Stochastic Frontier       
ߚ଴  
 
1.994*** 2.528*** 2.467*** 
ߚ௅  0.573*** 0.169*** 0.359*** 
ߚ௄  0.110*** 0.387*** 0.174*** 
ߚ௅௅  0.041*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 
ߚ௄௄  0.033*** 0.023*** 0.013*** 
ߚ௅௄   -0.054***  -0.048***  -0.031*** 
ߚ௧   -0.129***  -0.0936***  -0.048*** 
ߚ௧మ  0.010*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
ߚ௅௧  0.014*** 0.009*** 0.001 
ߚ௄௧   -0.009**  -0.005*** -0.003 
D_regio2  -0.193***  -0.145*** -0.052 
D_regio3  -0.162***  -0.076***  -0.117*** 
D_regio4  -0.082***  -0.060*** 0.029 
D_regio5 0.037 0.022  - 
D_regio6  - -0.028 0.117*** 
D_regio7  - 0.058**  - 
D_regio8  - 0.086*** 0.016 
D_regio9 -0.04 0.036 0.013 
D_regio10  0.144*** 0.235*** -0.013 
D_regio11  - 0.082***  - 
D_regio12  -0.158***  -0.096***  -0.133*** 
D_regio13  -0.140***  -0.257***  -0.182*** 
D_regio14  -  -0.049** -0.025 
D_regio15  - 0.087*** 0.120*** 
D_regio16 -0.036 0.043* -0.011 
D_regio17  - 0.013  - 
D_MLT -0.020 0.033** 0.125*** 
D_MHT_and_HT 0.079*** 0.049*** -0.004 
D_NM  0.054*** 0.070*** 0.038 
D_small  0.085*** -0.007 0.019 
D_medium_and_large -0.018 0.018 0.032 
Inefficiency Model       
0  
 
 -8.931***  -5.563***  -4.564*** 
D_year2  -3.474*  -1.109***  -0.854*** 
D_ year3  -1.495*  -2.130***  -2.281*** 
D_ year4  -3.248*  -3.399***  -3.819*** 
D_ year5  -1.253**  -3.752***  -3.113*** 
D_ year6 -0.399  -2.777***  -5.188*** 
D_ year7 2.344**  -1.540***  -2.083*** 
D_ year8  -  -0.148**  -2.785*** 
D_ year9  -  - 0.089 
Variance Parameters       
2
S  2.576*** 1.382*** 1.498*** 
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   0.946*** 0.929*** 0.939*** 
Loglikelihood Function       
LL -2327.870 -3336.724 -1397.143 
LR test of the one sided error 420.564 449.620 388.747 
Number of restrictions 8 9 10 
Number of iterations 100 62 54 
Number of cross-sections 527 1024 366 
Number of time periods 7 8 9 
Total number of observations 3689 8192 3294 
Note: Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. The reference category for size 
is D_micro (firms with less than 10 employees), while the reference 
category for technology is D_LT (low-tech manufacturing firms). 
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Table A3. Hypotheses testing for the functional form of the stochastic production 
function  
  Auction 2 Auction 3 Auction 4 
H0 
λ 
Decision 
whit 
respect to 
H0 λ 
Decision 
whit 
respect 
to H0 λ 
Decision whit 
respect to H0 
ߚ௝௞ ൌ 0		∀݆, ݇  
 
128.456*** Rejected 390.68*** Rejected 133.36*** Rejected 
ߚ௧ ൌ ߚ௧మ ൌ ߚ௞௧ ൌ 0		∀݇  46.080*** Rejected 39.69*** Rejected 18.20*** Rejected 
ߚ௧ ൌ ߚ௧మ ൌ 0  20.522*** Rejected 5.91** Rejected 2.64 Not Rejected 
ߚ௞௧ ൌ 0		∀݇  12.851*** Rejected  21.40*** Rejected  1.70 Not Rejected  
ߛ ൌ ߜ଴ ൌ ߜଵ ൌ ߜଶ ൌ 0  415.629*** Rejected 449.62*** Rejected 388.747*** Rejected 
Note: Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
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Appendix B. Policy effects in the Center-North regions 
 
Table B1. Multiple RDD estimates of the pre-treatment differences in TFP components 
and other covariates between subsidized and non-subsidized firms (CENTER-NORTH) 
 CENTER-NORTH REGIONS 
Dependent variable Low tech Medium-low tech 
Medium-high 
and high tech 
Non-
manufacturing Whole sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Technological Change -0.00394 -0.00565 0.00660 0.00423 -0.00059 
(0.01303) (0.00889) (0.01549) (0.03533) (0.00737) 
Scale Component 0.00303 -0.01016 0.01684 -0.02820 -0.00048 
(0.00709) (0.00433) (0.01782) (0.03861) (0.00627) 
Allocative Efficiency 0.03990 -0.10558 0.13599 -0.30894 -0.01613 
(0.07715) (0.09138) (0.08997) (0.20669) (0.05047) 
Technical Efficiency -0.01503 -0.00864 0.00638 -0.05216 -0.00893 
(0.01942) (0.01492) (0.01919) (0.02713)* (0.00972) 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
0.04231 -0.14109 0.18477 -0.26439 0.00358 
(0.06633) (0.09630) (0.10657)* (0.14449)* (0.04745) 
      
Tangible Capital 505.22 -578.47 -4794.22 -1561.93 -1255.93 
(2326.67) (1272.41) (5237.28) (1961.78) (1645.52) 
Value Added -3952.10 -289.84 -8021.70 -2120.12 -3722.82 
(4596.86) (439.29) (7330.42) (988.45)** (2532.68) 
Labor Cost per 
Employee 
-3209.93 -2231.42 -2918.15 622.11 -2569.87 
(1755.34)* (1158.49)* (4073.33) (3291.76) (1329.67)* 
# Employees -97.33 2.64 -25.12 -16.67 -47.52 
(106.75) (10.87) (51.67) (20.84) (46.73) 
ROE -6.93 -14.58 9.75 7.33 -3.59 
(8.64) (12.29) (9.10) (16.78) (6.42) 
Net liabilities 963.83 176.71 -12985.57 -1825.00 -2351.60 
(1937.09) (442.34) (9456.18) (1147.75) (2065.25) 
Cash Flow -148.65 -103.29 -4494.63 -798.79 -1121.80 
 (884.50) (161.14) (3429.07) (326.24) (829.59) 
Note: See notes of Table 1. 
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Table B2. Non-parametric and parametric Multiple RDD estimates (CENTER-NORTH) 
 Weighting scheme: Number of treated firms within the optimal bandwidth 
 Non-parametric estimates  Parametric estimates 
Dependent 
variable 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Technological 
Change 
0.0006 0.0010 0.0023 0.0035 0.0054  -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0017 
(0.0014) (0.0027) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0059)  (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0045) (0.0052) 
Scale 
Component 
-0.0036 0.0053 -0.0049 -0.0042 -0.0300  -0.0104 0.0024 -0.0175 -0.0012 -0.0171 
(0.0089) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0083) (0.0186)  (0.0122) (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0101) (0.0185) 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
-0.0016 0.0640 0.0644 0.0138 0.0180  0.0198 -0.0030 0.0473 -0.0003 0.0121 
(0.0561) (0.0633) (0.0652) (0.0651) (0.0615)  (0.0617) (0.0590) (0.0575) (0.0611) (0.0556) 
Technical 
Efficiency 
0.0120 0.0171 0.0319 0.0098 -0.0104  0.0195 0.0196 0.0282 0.0004 0.0142 
(0.0160) (0.0201) (0.0166)* (0.0403) (0.0423)  (0.0176) (0.0193) (0.0157)* (0.0373) (0.0402) 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
0.0179 0.0360 0.0449 0.0004 -0.0444  0.0373 0.0266 0.0638 0.0121 0.0198 
(0.0563) (0.0627) (0.0538) (0.0881) (0.0675)  (0.0617) (0.0631) (0.0555) (0.0784) (0.0685) 
Note: There are 800 observations (264 treated firms and 536 control firms); however, for non-parametric estimates the actual number of observations 
within the bandwidth ranges between 259 (142 T and 117 NT) and 341 (172 T and 169 NT) (it depends on the dependent variable and the year 
analyzed). Results are from local linear regression with triangular kernel using the robust confidence intervals and CCT implementation of mean-
squared-error optimal bandwidth selector developed by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014b). Estimation is implemented in the Stata package 
rdrobust by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014a). Bias is estimated with a quadratic polynomial. 95% robust confidence intervals are in brackets. 
Parametric regressions include a third-order polynomial in the forcing variable. These functions are estimated on both sides of the threshold 
separately. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. The estimates by technological sector are available upon request from the Authors. 
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Appendix C. Robustness tests 
 
Table C1. Non-parametric and parametric Multiple RDD estimates (SOUTH) using an alternative weighting scheme 
 Weighting scheme: Inverse-variance weighting 
 Non-parametric estimates  Parametric estimates 
Dependent 
variable 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Technological 
Change 
0.0042 0.0064 0.0081 0.0164 0.0249  0.0023 0.0021 0.0036 0.0097 0.0172 
(0.0026) (0.0047) (0.0068) (0.0090)* (0.0102)**  (0.0019) (0.0033) (0.0049) (0.0063) (0.0076)** 
Scale 
Component 
0.0053 -0.0071 -0.0046 0.0047 0.0105  0.0116 0.0048 0.0038 0.0108 0.0122 
(0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0091) (0.0105)  (0.0078) (0.0085) (0.0069) (0.0075) (0.0086) 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
-0.0825 -0.1312 -0.0088 0.1389 0.0912  -0.1207 -0.1366 0.0289 0.1170 0.0511 
(0.0619) (0.0662)** (0.0657) (0.0646)** (0.0635)  (0.0525)** (0.0604)** (0.0513) (0.0498)** (0.0530) 
Technical 
Efficiency 
-0.0463 -0.0580 -0.0587 -0.0106 -0.0925  -0.0367 -0.0331 -0.0390 -0.0285 -0.0193 
(0.0283) (0.0435) (0.0373) (0.0412) (0.0442)**  (0.0326) (0.0323) (0.0290) (0.0372) (0.0387) 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
-0.1362 -0.1681 -0.0691 0.1394 0.0479  -0.1494 -0.1561 -0.0116 0.1118 0.0750 
(0.0800)* (0.0864)* (0.0987) (0.0732)* (0.0989)  (0.0689)** (0.0729)** (0.0659) (0.0635)* (0.0747) 
Note: See notes of Table 3. 
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Table C2. Non-parametric and parametric Multiple RDD estimates (SOUTH) using a time-variant specification of itu   
 Weighting scheme: Number of treated firms within the optimal bandwidth 
 Non-parametric estimates  Parametric estimates 
Dependent 
variable 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5  Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Technological 
Change 
0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0029 0.0067  0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0010 0.0016 0.0048 
(0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0040)*  (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0040) 
Scale 
Component 
0.0077 0.0083 0.0020 0.0116 0.0022  0.0172 0.0190 0.0114 0.0164 0.0107 
(0.0112) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0139) (0.0130)  (0.0113) (0.0124) (0.0113) (0.0123) (0.0129) 
Allocative 
Efficiency 
-0.0627 -0.1446 0.0345 0.1723 0.0768  -0.1299 -0.1576 0.0344 0.1236 0.0359 
(0.0692) (0.0725)** (0.0714) (0.0737)** (0.0743)  (0.0647)** (0.0722)** (0.0679) (0.0643)* (0.0669) 
Technical 
Efficiency 
-0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009  -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0019)  (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
-0.0531 -0.1478 0.0140 0.1816 0.0833  -0.1032 -0.1474 0.0396 0.1379 0.0561 
(0.0646) (0.0703)** (0.0661) (0.0687)*** (0.0691)  (0.0623)* (0.0693)** (0.0644) (0.0607)** (0.0635) 
Note: There are 1074 observations (377 treated firms and 697 control firms); however, for non-parametric estimates, the actual number of 
observations within the bandwidth ranges between 463 (228 T and 235 NT) and 541 (255 T and 286 NT) (it depends on the dependent variable and 
the year analyzed). Results are from local linear regression with triangular kernel using the robust confidence intervals and CCT implementation 
of mean-squared-error optimal bandwidth selector developed by Calonico, Cattaneo & Titiunik (2014b). Estimation is implemented in the Stata 
package rdrobust by Calonico, Cattaneo & Titiunik (2014a). Bias is estimated with a quadratic polynomial. 95% robust confidence intervals are in 
brackets. Parametric regressions include a third-order polynomial in the forcing variable. These functions are estimated on both sides of the 
threshold separately. Significant at *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
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Appendix A. Production frontier estimates and specification tests 
 
Figure A1. Technical efficiency distributions 
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Appendix C. Robustness tests 
 
Figure C1. McCrary test for the analyzed rankings 
 
Note: This test is based on an estimator for the discontinuity at the cut-off in the density function of the forcing variable. 
The test is implemented as a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the discontinuity is zero. 
